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Abstract
Assistance games (also known as cooperative in-
verse reinforcement learning games) have been
proposed as a model for beneficial AI, wherein
a robotic agent must act on behalf of a human
principal but is initially uncertain about the hu-
man’s payoff function. This paper studies multi-
principal assistance games, which cover the more
general case in which the robot acts on behalf of
N humans who may have widely differing payoffs.
Impossibility theorems in social choice theory and
voting theory can be applied to such games, sug-
gesting that strategic behavior by the human prin-
cipals may complicate the robot’s task in learning
their payoffs. We analyze in particular a “bandit
apprentice” game in which the humans act first to
demonstrate their individual preferences for the
arms and then the robot acts to maximize the sum
of human payoffs. We explore the extent to which
the cost of choosing suboptimal arms reduces the
incentive to mislead—a form of natural mecha-
nism design. In this context we propose a social
choice method that uses shared control of a sys-
tem to combine preference inference with social
welfare optimization.
1. Introduction
The growing presence of AI systems that collaborate and
coexist with humans in society highlights the emerging need
to ensure that the actions of AI systems benefit society as a
whole. This question is formalized as the value alignment
problem in the AI safety literature (Amodei et al., 2016),
which emphasizes the need to align the increasingly pow-
erful and autonomous systems with those of their human
principal(s). However, humans are prone to misspecify their
objectives which can lead to unexpected behaviors (Amodei
et al., 2016); hence research in value alignment has focused
1Department of EECS, University of California, Berke-
ley, USA. Correspondence to: Arnaud Fickinger <ar-
naud.fickinger@berkeley.edu>.
Accepted at the Workshop on Incentives in Machine Learning,
ICML 2020, Vienna, Austria, 2020. Copyright 2020 by the au-
thor(s).
on deriving preferences from human actions. In the body of
research in value alignment and human robot interaction, the
majority of the work involves scenarios with one human and
one AI system. It is an appealing setting because the robot
and the human share the same goal. Therefore, methods
in this setting such as inverse reinforcement learning (Ng
et al., 2000; Abbeel & Ng, 2004; Ramachandran & Amir,
2007), inverse reward design (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2017),
and LILA (Woodward et al., 2019) revolve around how an
AI system can optimally learn the preferences of the human
and apply these results to novel environments. Similarly,
the human’s incentive is to optimally teach the robot its own
preferences. The combination of a learning AI system and
a teaching human yields the assistance game (also known
as the cooperative inverse reinforcement learning game)
(Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016).
However, AI systems in the real world do not fit this one
human, one AI paradigm. Recommendation systems, au-
tonomous vehicles, and parole algorithms do not exist in a
vacuum—they often influence and are influenced by multi-
ple humans. Hence, we consider a variation on assistance
games where a robot acts on behalf of multiple humans,
which we call the multi-principal assistance game (MPAG).
The key difference between this and the scenario with only
one human is that, in general, different humans have dif-
ferent preferences, so it is impossible to align the AI to
perfectly match the preferences of everyone. The problem
of aggregating individual preferences for making collective
decisions has been studied by economists and philosophers
for more than two hundred years and constitutes the heart
of social choice theory (Sen, 1986).
Even with a given aggregation method, however, the infer-
ence process itself is challenged by the presence of self-
ish agents. While the robot acts to optimize the aggregate
of utilities, each human acts to optimize their own utility.
Therefore, unlike the single-principal assistance game, the
multi-principal assistance game is no longer fully cooper-
ative. This creates a problem for existing value alignment
algorithms. These algorithms work under the assumption
that the demonstrations and information provided are truly
representative of the human’s preferences. However, the
misalignment between the AI system and each human’s
preferences yields a perverse incentive for the humans: can
they misrepresent their preferences to gain a more desirable
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outcome?
We begin with a subclass of MPAGs that generalizes ap-
prenticeship learning. In multi-principal apprenticeship
learning, the robot observes trajectories from multiple hu-
mans and then produces a trajectory that maximizes a social
aggregate of the inferred rewards. We state an impossibility
result for this setting based on Gibbard’s theorem in social
choice theory. Our experiments confirm that human demon-
strations may indeed “misrepresent” their preferences, given
a robot that runs maximum entropy inverse reinforcement
learning.
We contrast the impossibility result by introducing another
subclass of MPAGs based on the multi-armed bandit setting.
In the multi-principal bandit apprentice setting, the robot is
teleoperated by multiple humans. We show under this set-
ting that because demonstrations yield an immediate reward,
learning from demonstrations can decrease the incentive to
misrepresent one’s preferences by incurring a cost of lying.
By drawing an analogy between our setting and voting the-
ory, we bring a new perspective on the impossibility results
by showing that voting by demonstrating reduces the pro-
portion of manipulable profiles. In this setting, the robot
can choose which human to give control to and whether to
perform an action or not. We use this active learning as
a basis to construct an approximately efficient mechanism
where humans are incentivized to share the full spectrum of
their preferences.
1.1. Related Work
Value Alignment. The need for AI systems to align with
the preferences of humans is well documented in AI safety
literature (Amodei et al., 2016). A first line of work formu-
lates goal inference as an inverse planning problem (Baker
et al., 2007). For example, Inverse Reinforcement Learning
computes a reward such that the observed trajectory is opti-
mal in the underlying Markov Decision Process (MDP) (Ng
et al., 2000) (Ziebart et al., 2008). A common assumption
of inverse planning methods is that the robot does not influ-
ence the decision-making of the human. However, previous
work has shown that the presence of a robot has a significant
influence on humans (Robins et al., 2004) (Kanda et al.,
2004). Furthermore, it has been shown that the robot can
benefit from interacting with the human to infer the goal.
For example, Hadfield-Menell et al. have shown that if we
formulate goal inference as a game between the human and
the robot, observing the optimal trajectory of the human is
in general a sub-optimal strategy (Hadfield-Menell et al.,
2016). On the contrary, previous work has experimentally
shown the emergence of active learning and teaching when
optimizing for a joint policy in the value alignment problem
(Woodward et al., 2019). Therefore, modelling collabora-
tion as a game, where both human and robot are aware of
their mutual influence, is arguably the most promising ap-
proach for efficient human-robot interaction (HRI) (Dragan,
2017).
Mechanism Design. An important result in social choice
theory and mechanism design is the Gibbard–Satterthwaite
theorem, which states that, for universal domain of utility
functions, every non-trivial game form is subject to strate-
gic or dishonest actions from the players (Gibbard, 1973),
which can be extended to non-deterministic mechanisms as
well (Gibbard, 1978). This impossibility theorem applies
the most general case of multi-principal assistance games as
well. Approaches in mechanism design seek to create games
where players each acting rationally yield the desired out-
come. In a pseudo-linear environment, the VCG mechanism
and the expected externality mechanism achieve different
forms of incentive-compatibility, meaning players are incen-
tived to act truthfully (Börgers, 2015). These mechanisms
do so by impose transfers, so the externalities of a player’s
strategic behavior are borne by that player.
Voting Theory. Similarly, voting theory, a branch of so-
cial choice theory, has also focused on building systems
robust to human manipulation. Recently much attention
has been given to incorporating ideas of Voting Theory in
the design of multiagent systems (Ephrati & Rosenschein,
1996). Our work formalize voting theory in a hybrid human-
robot setting: humans “vote" via their demonstrations, and
the robot’s resulting actions represent the resulting “collec-
tive decision." In particular, our setup is similar to ordinal
voting, since the robot does not access to a cardinal utility
function (Boutilier et al., 2015); as a result, the collective
decision may not be socially optimal (Procaccia & Rosen-
schein, 2006).
Human-Robot Team Robot evolving in a multi-human
environment has already been studied by works on human-
robot team in the HRI literature. Much work has focused on
trust building and resource allocation (Claure et al., 2019).
A common assumption is that the robot and the humans have
a common payoff known to the robot. Our work generalize
this setting to general-sum payoffs possibly unknown to the
robot.
2. Impossibility Result for Learning from
Multiple Humans
2.1. Multi-Principal Apprenticeship Learning
We formalize the problem of learning from multiple humans
as multi-principal apprenticeship learning (MPAL), a spe-
cific multi-principal assistance game that elucidates the pro-
cess of learning from human demonstrations. A MPAL con-
sists of a multi-agent world model, a Markov decision pro-
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cess without a reward function, M\R = 〈S,A, P, µ0, T 〉
(Abbeel & Ng, 2004) with N humans and one robot where:
• S is the set of states.
• A is the set of actions.
• P : S ×A× S → [0, 1] is the transition function.
• µ0 is the initial state distribution
• T is the horizon
Each human h has a private reward function R∗h : S → R
that is unknown to the robot. We use a social welfare func-
tion W to aggregate these individual preferences into a
single objective R∗ = W (R∗1, . . . , R
∗
N ). The robot’s objec-
tive is to maximize R∗ in the world model defined above,
despite initial uncertainty about the individual rewards R∗i .
Social welfare functions are a heavily studied field, exam-
ples include the utilitarian criterion WU (R∗1, ..., R
∗
N ) =∑
hR
∗
h (Liu et al., 2015) and the egalitarian criterion
WE(R
∗
1, ..., R
∗
N ) = minhR
∗
h (Zhang & Shah, 2014; Nace
& Pióro, 2008).
The robot doesn’t have direct access to the human reward
functions. Instead each human h provides a collection of ph
trajectories through the state space ξh = (ξi1, ..., ξ
i
pi) ∈ Ξph ,
where Ξ = (S × A)T−1 × S. Each trajectory is drawn
from h’s policy, ψh ∈ 4Π, where Π denote the set of
deterministic policies in this MDP. Therefore, our overall
objective is to build a mechanism M : (Ξ)
∑
ph → 4Π
such thatM(ξ1, ..., ξN ) is optimal in M∗.
Example 1 (MPAL via IRL). One such mechanism lever-
ages inverse reinforcement learning (Abbeel & Ng, 2004).
This method estimates each reward separately and optimizes
the robot’s policy for the estimated aggregation of rewards.
Formally:
• IRL : P(Ξ)→ RS defined on the set of subsets of Ξ
• RL : RS → Π returns an optimal policy
• M(ξ1, ..., ξN ) = RL ◦W (IRL(ξ1), ..., IRL(ξN ))
Note that this formalism also accounts for IRLmethods that
return a distribution over rewards because we can always
marginalize over the uncertainty in the reward function (Ra-
machandran & Amir, 2007):
Theorem 1. If IRL returns a distribution over reward,
then the mechanism defined by M(ξ1, ..., ξN ) = RL ◦
E[W (IRL(ξ1), ..., IRL(ξN ))] maximizes the expected
value function over the induced distribution of MDPs.
Example 2 (Voting). If the world model is stateless and the
reward functions are defined on the action space, then MPAL
is a voting system where humans get immediate reward by
voting.
2.2. Manipulability of Multi-Principal Apprenticeship
Learning
We assume in this section that the mechanismM is defined
directly on the space of strategies of the humans (4Π)N .
The humans receive a reward when performing a demonstra-
tion (learning phase (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016)) and a
reward when the robot acts in the MDP (deployement phase).
Therefore, the total expected utility for h is the combination
of the two phases:
Uh(ψh, ψ−h, pi,M) =piEpih∼ψh(V pih(R∗h))+
Epir∼M(ψ)(V
pir (R∗h))
(1)
where V pi(R) is the value of the policy pi in the MDP in-
duced by R.
More generally, we introduce a coefficient α that quantify
the relative weight that the humans put on the learning
phase:
Uh(ψh, ψ−h, αi,M) =αiEpih∼ψh(V pii(R∗h))+
(1− αi)Epir∼M(ψ)(V pir (R∗h))
(2)
In our case, the more demonstrations a human provides,
the more weight they will put on the learning phase. In
other words, α increases as the number of demonstrations
increases. In the contrary, α decreases as the number of
times the robot acts increases.
The total utility each human gets depends on the strategy of
the other players through the robot’s inference. Therefore,
even if the humans act independently in the learning phase,
the shared interest in the robot’s actions during deployment
induces a game between them.
Ideally we would like to have a mechanism such that the
action of one human is not influenced by the action of other
humans. This would ensure that the mechanism is not ma-
nipulable and stays aligned with its initial purpose. For-
mally:
Definition 1 (Straightforward Mechanism). We say that
(M, α) is straightforward if every human Hi has a domi-
nant strategy in the game induced byM and α:
∀h ∈ [1, N ],∃ψ∗h∀ψ−h,∀ψh,Uh(ψ∗h, ψ−h, αh,M) ≥
Uh(ψh, ψ−h, αh,M)
(3)
When α is small, i.e. the demonstration is relatively
insignificant compared to the robot actions, the Gib-
bard–Satterthwaite (Gibbard, 1973) can be applied to show
that the only straightforward mechanism are trivial.
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Theorem 2 (Based on Gibbard 1973). For sufficiently small
α, the only straightforward deterministic mechanisms are
as follows:
• Duple mechanisms, where the set of possible trajecto-
ries are restricted to two.
• There exists one human that can choose among the
possible trajectories (dictatorship).
Furthermore, we can extend Gibbard’s 1978 theorem (Gib-
bard, 1978) for non-deterministic mechanisms.
Theorem 3 (Based on Gibbard 1978). On the domain of
versatile1 policies, any straightforward mechanism must be
a probability mixture of mechanisms of two kind:
• Duple mechanisms
• Unilateral games, where one human gets to choose
among a certain set of possible lotteries over trajecto-
ries.
2.3. Experiment: Attacking Inverse Reinforcement
Learning
The theorems in Section 2.2 apply when α is sufficiently
small. However, there can still be incentives for strategic
behavior in games where α is non-negligible. In this sec-
tion, we consider a mechanism based on Maximum Entropy
IRL (Ziebart et al., 2008) and introduce a solver to manipu-
late it.
More specifically, our mechanism has 3 steps. First, we ag-
gregates all of the human player’s trajectories into a single
dataset. Second, the mechanism uses Maximum Entropy
IRL (Ziebart et al., 2008) to infer a reward reward func-
tion. Finally, we execute a policy that optimizes this reward
function. Formally:
M(ξ1, ..., ξN ) = RL ◦MEIRL(ξ1, ..., ξN ) (4)
Theorem 4. The mechanism presented above is not straight-
forward.
To show that, we introduce a quadratic program (QP) solver
that heuristically creates adversarial trajectories against
Maximum Entropy IRL. Similarly to previous work on
single-agent value alignment (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016;
Ho et al., 2016), the QP solver finds an approximate best-
response trajectory in a three-player game with one robot
and two humans. We suppose that each human gives a
single trajectory to the robot and the robot aggregates the
trajectories to find a single reward parameter to train its
policy.
1A strategy is versatile if the set of utility profile for which it is
dominant has interior points.
The human’s goal is to optimize for immediate reward,
balanced with future reward from the robot’s deployment.
While it is hard to directly optimize the result of the robot’s
inference, the average feature counts in the trajectory dataset
have been used as an effective proxy(Hadfield-Menell et al.,
2016; Ho et al., 2016). Formally, we capture this by defin-
ing a QP that optimizes for a combination of immediate
reward and the distance of the final features from a target
(see appendix for the full derivation):
max
ρts,a
∑
s,a,t
γtρts,aφ(s)
Tw
− λ||
∑
s,a,t
ρts,aφ(s)− (2E[φ|w]− φ(ξ1))||2
s.t
∑
a
ρt+1s,a =
∑
s′,a
P (s′, a, s)ρts′,a
∀s,∀t ∈ [0, T − 1]∑
a
ρ0s,a = µ0[s] ∀s
(5)
where ρ is the occupancy measure, φ is the feature space
embedding, P is the transition matrix, T is the horizon,
µ0 is the initial state distribution, λ weights the relative
importance of the outcome of the robot’s policy, ω is the
reward parameter, E[φ|w] is the expected feature count of
a policy optimal for the MDP induced by ω and ξ1 is the
trajectory of the first human.
This is a regularized dual of the linear program formulation
for finite-horizon discounted Markov Decision Process (Put-
erman, 2014). The best-response trajectory can be directly
derived from the occupancy measure.
The experimental results in a 2D gridworld environment are
presented in Figure 1. The environment is characterized
by a three-dimensional feature space and an horizon of 40.
The reward parameter of the second human is fixed and
equal to ω2 = (0.9, 1, 0). We compute their best-response
trajectories to two different humans, one with reward pa-
rameter ω1 = (1, 0, 0) and another with reward parameter
ω1 = (0, 0, 1). In the former case, the total utility is maxi-
mized by playing the optimal trajectory but in the latter case,
the best-response found by our QP solver is not the optimal
trajectory. Figure 1 presents the optimal trajectory versus
approximate best response in the latter case.
3. Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent
Alignment
We now propose a social choice method that uses shared
control of a system to combine preference inference with
social welfare optimization. In this context, we demonstrate
the possibility of non-trivial straightforward and approxi-
mately efficient mechanisms.
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Figure 1. Manipulating a Multi-Agent Alignment IRL Method us-
ing a QP in a 2D 5× 6 Gridworld Environment with a 3D feature
space. First row: True reward of humans 1 and 2; State visitation
count of optimal (resp. best-response) trajectories of human 2 (the
initial state is in the bottom left-hand corner). Second row: Recov-
ered rewards using IRL on the aggregate of first human’s optimal
and second human’s optimal (resp. best-response) trajectories;
Optimal robot trajectories in the MDP induced by these rewards.
3.1. Multi-Principal Bandit Apprentice (MPBA)
Imagine a teloperation setting with multiple human princi-
pals. The robot wants to implement a policy that will have
an impact on several humans. To choose a policy optimized
for this specific group of human it needs to learn about each
individual’s preferences by letting them operate simultane-
ously or successively. If it let them operate only a few times,
it might not get enough information about their preferences
and end up with a suboptimal policy in term of social wel-
fare. In the contrary, as long as it is operated by humans,
the robot’s policy is not optimized for the social welfare
but rather each individual’s preferences. We model this
exploration-exploitation problem with a multi-armed bandit
setting adapted to our multi-agent alignment problem.
In the classical setting of the multi-armed bandit, a single
player receives an arm-dependent stochastic reward each
time they pull an arm. Their goal is to find a policy mapping
history of actions and rewards to actions that minimizes the
regret by finding the good trade-off between exploration and
exploitation.
We deviate from the classical setting in several respects.
First, N > 1 humans are pulling arms and the rewards on
each arm are deterministic, specific to each human, and
known to each human R∗h : [1,M ] → [0, 1]. The humans
are not exploring; they are communicating information to
the robot. Second, the robot can decide to pull an arm
itself or it can choose one human to pull an arm in the
next round. Third, when a human pulls an arm, the robot
observes only that fact and does not observe the reward
received. We assume that each person’s total utility is the
same: ∀h,∑aR∗h(a) = 1.
As in the previous part, we suppose that the designers of the
system would like to maximize a social welfare function that
aggregates utility. Formally, we define the social welfare of
arm a as wa = 1N
∑N
h=1R
∗
h(a) and w
∗ = maxa wa. For
t ∈ [1, T ], the random variables Ht, At, and Wt represent
respectively the human chosen, the action chosen and the
social welfare obtained at time t. Since the robot can choose
itself, the codomain of Ht is [1,N+1]. We also denote by
H˜t the restriction of Ht to [1,N]: p(H˜t) = p(Ht|Ht ≤ N)
The objective of the robot is to minimize cumulative regret
with respect to social welfare:
minRT = E
T∑
t=1
W ∗ −Wt (6)
3.2. Hardness of MPBA
To begin with we consider the non-strategic setting. We
suppose that the humans implement a stationary policy to
approximately optimize immediate reward:
p(At|H˜t) ∝ eβR
∗
H˜t
(At) (7)
where β is a parameter describing how close are humans
from making optimal decisions.
A setting similar to ours has been studied to formalize as-
sistance to a single human (Chan et al., 2019). In their
setting, at each round the single human suggests an arm to
pull and the robot pulls an arm based on the arms suggested
so far. They show that if the human is noisily optimal—
the probability of suggesting the best arm is strictly greater
than the probability of suggesting a suboptimal arm—then
simply pulling the most commonly suggested arm achieves
finite expected regret, contrasting with the lower bound in
Ω(log T ) for the classical setting.
The following theorems show that the multi-agent setting is
harder than its single-agent counterpart.
Theorem 5. In a bandit assistance game with a single hu-
man, any utility profile leads to zero regret when β → ∞
and the robot uses an explore-then-commit strategy.
Theorem 6. In a bandit assistance game with multiple hu-
mans, there is a utility profile such that the regret is in Ω(T )
when β → ∞ and the robot uses an explore-then-commit
strategy.
Intuitively, inferring the best arm is not sufficient to maxi-
mize the social welfare when there are multiple humans.
3.3. Incentive-Compatibility of Voting by
Demonstrating
We now consider the strategic setting. Each human h acts
following a policy ψh : ([1,M ] × [1, N ])∗ → 4[1,M ]
mapping history of human-action pairs to action and aims
to maximize its utility E(
∑
t r
∗
h(At)).
MPBA can be seen as a voting system where instead of
announcing their type, the humans demonstrate it. The next
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theorems show that our setting is more robust to manipula-
tion than classical voting systems.
Formally, define the truthfulness γh of a human strategy ψh
as the frequency of choosing among the best arms:
γh =
∑T
1 I(Ht = h)I(At ∈ arg maxaR∗h(a))∑T
1 I(Ht = h)
(8)
We say that ψh is truthful if γh = 1.
We assume that the robot uses an explore-then-commit strat-
egy with an exploration time of N · T and an exploitation
time of 1. The next theorem states that increasing the explo-
ration time decreases the number of non-dominated untruth-
ful strategies. We denote by 4∗h the minimal suboptimal
gap of h and we assume that every humans has at least one
suboptimal arm.
Theorem 7. Given γ ∈]0, 1[, if T > R∗h(1−γ)4∗h then any
strategy ψh such that γh < γ is strictly dominated by a
truthful strategy.
Example 3 (Plurality Voting with Shared Con-
trol). The robot chooses the arm to pull follow-
ing: aR = arg maxa
∑N
i=1 1(a˜i = a) where
a˜i = arg maxa
∑T
t=1 1(a
i
t = a).
By using Theorem 4, we can characterize the incentive-
compatibility of this mechanism.
Corollary 1. For any domain of utilities D,C = {u ∈
RM : u∗ < C ∧ (u∗ = u∗∗ ∨ u∗ − u∗∗ > )}, where
u∗ = maxa u(a) and u∗∗ = maxa{u(a) : u(a) 6= u∗}, if
T > 2C , then the plurality voting with shared control is non-
dictatorial, does not limit the possible outcomes to two alter-
natives and it is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible on
D,C . In the limit T →∞ we have an incentive-compatible
mechanism on the universal domain.
When the exploration time is equal to the exploitation time,
voting by demonstrating is subject to manipulation. We can
nevertheless quantify the robustness of such a system by
comparing its proportion of manipulable profiles to the one
of classical systems. Formally, let’s define a manipulable
profile:
Definition 2 (Manipulable profile). We say that a profile r∗h
is manipulable in the game induced byM if there is ψ−h
and ψh such that γh < 1 and for any truthful strategy ψ∗h,
Uh(ψ
∗
h, ψ−h,M) < Uh(ψh, ψ−h,M).
Using a geometric argument on the 2-simplex we can prove
the following:
Theorem 8. In a system using plurality voting with ran-
dom tiebreak with 3 voters and 3 alternatives, the set of
manipulable profile by demonstrating is included in the set
of manipulable profile by announcing. Furthermore, the
proportion of manipulable profile by announcing but not by
demonstrating is 19 .
3.4. Efficient MPBA
In the previous section we have seen that voting by demon-
strating provides a naturally incentive-compatible mecha-
nism. Yet our first aim is to maximize the social welfare,
therefore we want to build an approximately efficient mech-
anism. As we have seen, it is hard to optimize social welfare
because observations of optimal human behavior provides
limited information the corresponding utility functions. An
alternative is to build a mechanism that incentivizes the
humans to provide information about their entire utility
function, not just their optimal arm. By analogy with the
voting theory literature, we define the distortion for a given
robot strategyM as the ratio between the optimal social
welfare and the social welfare obtained by the robot in the
worst case.
4(M) = max
R∗
maxa
∑
hR
∗
h(a)
E(
∑
h(R
∗
h(a
M
R (ψ
∗(R∗,M)))) (9)
where ψ∗(R∗,M) is the best response toM for the profile
R∗.
By building on recent results in ordinal voting theory
(Boutilier et al., 2015) we can construct an approximately
efficient mechanismM. In broad outline, the robot chooses
a human and execute the action only if the human did not
choose this action before. Periodically, the robot choose a
random action with probability 1
2
1
M
. We present the full
algorithm in the appendix and show that this algorithm in-
centivizes the humans to share their true ordinal preferences.
We derive the following upper-bound for the distortion:
Theorem 9. 4(M) = O(√M logM)
4. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we explore an area of concern in the study of
AI alignment—ensuring that AI systems are designed so
that humans agents are incentivized to interact with AI sys-
tems in a “honest" way. Applying the Gibbard–Satterthwaite
theorem to this scenario indicate that demonstrations with
little to no significance are subject to strategic behavior.
Experimental results show that a commonly used inverse re-
inforcement learning paradigm, which works well in single-
human alignment instances, is prone to manipulative be-
havior. However, on a modified setting, we find effective
mechanisms can arise from learning human preferences via
their actions if those actions are sufficiently consequential.
The overall problem of preventing manipulative behavior
in multi-human AI systems is open and presents many op-
portunities for further work. Our methods are applied to
fairly simple problems: there exists a need to generalize
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these results to more general theoretical settings and more
complicated situations in the real world.
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